A CRITICAL STUDY OF VIRTUE ETHICS IN ARISTOTLE AND KANT

A CRITICAL STUDY OF VIRTUE ETHICS IN ARISTOTLE AND KANT

Aristotle was the first western thinker to divide philosophy into branches which are still recognizable today: logic, metaphysics, and natural philosophy, philosophy of mind, ethics and politics, rhetoric; he made major contributions in all these fields. He was born in Stagira, a city of northern Greece in 384 BC. His father Nicomachus was a doctor at the court of Amyntas of Macedon, who preceded Philip, the conqueror of much of Greece. Aristotle later served as tutor to Philip’s remarkable son, Alexander the Great.

As a young man Aristotle went to Athens in 367 to study as a disciple of Plato at his Academy, remaining there until Plato’s death in 347. Aristotle returned to Athens and founded his own philosophical school, the Lyceum. He died in 322 BC, a year after he had to leave Athens in the wake of the death of his former pupil, the emperor Alexander.

Three works on ethics have come down under his name: Nicomachean ethics in ten ‘books’, Eudemian ethics in eight ‘books’, and the so-called Magna Moralia or ‘great Ethics’. In these Nicomachean ethics is considered as Aristotle’s major and definitive work in ethics at least than others. According to Aristotle the highest good for human beings is Eudaimonia/happiness and that a rational choice of life will be one directed to one’s own happiness. Only a life in which one cultivates the traditional virtues will be a happy life. Eudaimonia, or 'happiness', is the supreme goal of human life. Aristotle believed that everything has a purpose - the good for a knife is to cut, and a good knife is one that cuts well. In the same way, Eudaimonia is the 'good' for a person.
Aristotle draws a distinction between superior and subordinate aims. Why do I study ethics? Maybe to get a qualification. I get the qualification to get a good job, and I want a good job because... These are subordinate aims. At some point you stop and say 'because that would make me happy' - and this becomes the superior aim. 'Eudaimonia' is the end goal or purpose behind everything we do as people, and is desired for its own sake.

Virtue Ethics

“Virtues are those qualities that can enable someone to live well and fulfill themselves as a human being. There are various lists of virtues but the ‘cardinal virtues listed by the ancient Greek were justice, temperance, courage, and practical wisdom.” Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take the form known as "neo-Aristotelian", almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue) prognosis/ phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and Eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing.) As modern virtue ethics has grown and more people have become familiar with its literature, the understanding of these terms has increased, but it is still the case that readers familiar only with modern philosophy tend to misinterpret them.

Immanuel Kant V/s. Aristotle on Virtue Ethics

“Kant’s moral theory is adumbrated in The Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals. Its key tenets include the idea that ‘good will’ is the only unconditionally good thing and that to have moral worth actions must be done from the motive of duty, emotions, feelings, and inclinations, even benevolent ones, contribute nothing to the moral worth of an action any moral worth, but only its being done for the sake of duty. Famously he writes; ‘I ought never to act except on such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.’ In a different formulation, he insists that one must always treat humanity never solely as means but always also an end in itself.”

Even from this very brief sketch some seemingly sharp contrasts with Aristotle’s theory are evident. For Kant ‘good will’ is the unconditionally good thing, for Aristotle’s happiness. While Aristotle assumes that one’s own happiness is the end it is rational to aim at, and is what the phronimos is concerned with, Kant goes so far as to deny that one’s own happiness should be any proper concern of what he calls ‘ pure practical reason’. This is no doubt in part because Kant differed from Aristotle in his understanding of happiness. For Aristotle calls merely ‘continent’, since what matters is whether the agent is motivated by duty, not what their feelings are. Kant cannot allow that moral worth could depend in any way in non-rational appetites or inclinations. And though both thinkers lay important stress on the role of reason in the ethical life, it takes a rather different form in each. Universality is the hallmark of the hallmark of the morality of a maxim for Kant. Aristotle, however, in his account of practical wisdom, lays more emphasis on the particularity of the circumstances and the need for the phronimos to ‘see’ the ethically salient features in each case.

Consequentiality theories, of which utilitarianism is the most famous version, take a very different form. Jermy Bentham and J.S. Mill – a close reader of Aristotle - are the most famous advocates of utilitarianism. As we saw, Kant’s theory emphasized the motive if duty and denied any role to consequences, as its name suggests, regards the consequences of actions as the only feature relevant to their rightness. For utilitarianism, what makes an action right is that it is the one that maximizes the general happiness. In so far as it holds that happiness is the sole intrinsically valuable thing, it seems closer to Aristotle’s theory.

CONCLUSION

Despite their enormous differences, Kantian and Aristotelian ethical theories share some features. Both are primarily concerned with what makes actions right (or, in Kant’s terms, what gives actions moral worth). Both seem to require impartiality, certain disinterestedness, and a detachment from one’s own concerns. That is not to say that for these theories morality is simply a matter if one’s relation to others: Kant holds that one has duties to oneself. But “the Kantian ethical theory laid emphasis on disinterestedness and impartiality that contrasts sharply with what we might call the agent–centered approach of Aristotle” . While “Kantian theory is by no means narrowly egoistic, it is certainly ego- centered.”











BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. David Ross. Oxford University Press: London, 1980.
2. Thompson, Mel. Teach Yourself : Ethics. Transet Limited: London, 1994




[1] Thompson, Teach Yourself, 95.
[2] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, xviii.
[3] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, xix.
[4] Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, xix

ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPT OF EUDAIMONIA

ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPT OF EUDAIMONIA

Introduction
Eudaimonia is a state variously translated from Greek as 'well-being', 'happiness', 'blessedness', and in the context of virtue ethics, 'human flourishing'. Eudaimonia in this sense is not a subjective, but an objective, state. It characterizes the well-lived life, irrespective of the emotional state of the person experiencing it. According to Aristotle, the most prominent exponent of eudaimonia is the proper goal of human life. It consists of exercising the characteristic human quality, reason as the soul's most proper and nourishing activity. “Aristotle, like Plato before him, argued that the pursuit of eudaimonia was an activity that could only properly be exercised in the characteristic human community.”
Aristotle categorized the virtues as moral and intellectual. Aristotle identified nine intellectual virtues, the most important of which was wisdom; sophia (theoretical wisdom) and phronesis (practical wisdom). The other eight moral virtues included prudence, justice, fortitude, courage, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, and temperance. Aristotle argued that each of the moral virtues was a mean Golden Mean between two corresponding vices.
“The causal factors relevant to living well, to eudaimonia, are all, they claim, within the agent’s firm grasp; external uncontrolled happiness can neither significantly enhance nor significantly diminish good living.” Eudaimonia is used to refer to the life that is most desirable or satisfying. Therefore, it's the objective of each person, generally translated into English as "happiness" or "well being".
The 'Father of Eudaimonia' was Aristotle. He introduced and famously explored the concept in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he argued that all 'good' acts performed by someone would lead to their greater well-being. His main argument for this rested on the assumption that everything in the world had an end/purpose. For example, a knife is made for the purpose of cutting things and as such the best use of it is the purpose for which it was made (i.e. for cutting things), rather than say digging a hole in the ground, or turning a screw in the wall.
One of the ways Aristotle's moral theory has been put into practice, is found in the concept of natural moral law. This is the idea that the 'right' thing to do is what it is natural for something to do. The Catholic Church has particularly adopted this way of looking at the moral issue of abortion, saying that it is not natural to stop a pregnancy, and as such doing so is morally wrong.
In the same way, Aristotle argued that humans have a telos, and as such the best life they can live is one where everything they do is directed towards fulfilling it. As such, fulfilling their 'telos' would lead people to adopt certain attitudes and behaviors in order to do so, which were understood as the 'virtues' .All this meant that the desire to be successful in life or to do what one was meant to do, and as such achieve eudaimonia, led people to become 'good' people.

Eudaimonia as an End in Itself

Discussing who the “happy man” is, Aristotle identifies 3 popular views of the nature of life. 1) Life is pleasure; 2) Life is honor; 3) Life is making money. But none of them are according to virtue, either, because it doesn't consider its sources and impacts or because it depends on an external recognition. Therefore, the happy life should be of a fourth nature, a contemplative life, and an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.



Eudaimonia is not a State But an Activity
Eudaimonia is not a state or a feeling of amusement. That's because it's not short-lived, it's not external to ourselves and its dependent on how we do what we do. It's our virtues, which differ us from other living beings. It comprises both moral and intellectual excellence, as well as both practical and theoretical wisdom. The consistent practice of these virtues is Eudaimonia.

Not Duty nor Happiness but Eudaimonia

Modern ethical debate tends to be about exploring what makes an action moral. For instance, Immanuel Kant argued that moral activity was about doing our 'duty', whereas Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill believed it was about doing that which benefited the greatest number of people. This meant that for Kant acting in the right way occurred when one did their duty, whereas for Bentham and Mill it was when we maximized the amount of pleasure to others through our actions.
However, for Aristotle eudaimonia was not to be sought for any particular reason, but was an end in itself. In other words, we should not desire eudaimonia because it is our duty to seek it, or in order to increase the amount of happiness in the world. If we wanted to achieve eudaimonia in order to be happy for example, then 'happiness' would be the 'end', not eudaimonia. For Aristotle, the desire to achieve eudaimonia is a defining characteristic of what it means to be human. In other words, wanting to be successful is a defining aspect of being human. We do not see people putting a lot of time and effort into things they believe they will fail at or which they believe will make them unhappy. For everyone, no matter whom they are or where they live, seek to develop those skills, qualities, or obtain certain things and even get to know people that will enable them to live successful, prosperous, happy and contented lives. This is why Aristotle believed eudaimonia was the telos of human life, for it can be seen to affect all of our choices and decisions.

Eudaimonia and Modern Moral Philosophy

Interest in the concept of eudaimonia and ancient ethical theory more generally has enjoyed a tremendous revival in the twentieth century. This is largely due to the work of Elizabeth Anscombe. In her article "Modern Moral Philosophy," Anscombe argued that duty based conceptions of morality are conceptually incoherent for they are based on the idea of a "law without a lawgiver." The point is that a system of morality conceived along the lines of the Ten Commandments, as a system of rules for action, depends on someone having actually made these rules. However, in a modern climate, which is unwilling to accept that morality depends on God in this way, the rule-based conception of morality is stripped of its metaphysical foundation. Anscombe recommends a return the eudemonistic ethical theories of the ancients, particularly Aristotle, which ground morality in the interests and well being of human moral agents, and can do so without appealing to any questionable metaphysics.

Is Eudaimonia Vulnerable?

The good condition theorist argue that eudaimonia is vulnerable because it consists simply in having a good ethical state or condition and because this condition is itself stable even under the direst circumstances. But Aristotle argues that states of character are vulnerable to external influences. Or he would argue that good states are not by themselves sufficient for good living. “Eudaimonia requires actual activity for its completion, and second, that good human activity can be disrupted or decisively impeded by various forms of luck.”
“We agree, Aristotle says, that our end is eudaimonia; but we agree on just about nothing concerning it, except the name. One further agreement, however, emerging near the beginning of the Nichomachean Ethics: it concerns the connection of eudaimonia its activity.” So we can see from the start that the opponent who makes the good life consists in a non-active state or condition, removing it altogether from its realization in activity, is going against beliefs of ours that are as broadly shared as any ever brought forward by Aristotle in the ethical works.

Conclusion

Although eudaimonia was first popularized by Aristotle, it now belongs to the tradition of virtue theories generally. For the virtue theorist, eudaimonia describes that state achieved by the person who lives the proper human life, an outcome that can be reached by practicing the virtues. A virtue is a habit or quality that allows the bearer to succeed at his, her, or its purpose. The virtue of a knife, for example, is sharpness; among the virtues of a racehorse is speed. Thus to identify the virtues for human beings, one must have an account of what the human purpose is.
Bibliograhpy
1. Nussbaum, Martha C. The Fragility of Goodness:Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy.Cambridge University Press: Cambrige,1986.

“PLEASURE” IN THE VIEW OF ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS

"PLEASURE" IN THE VIEW OF ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS

Introduction
From the very beginning of the life of a child, it has a soft corner towards love. It is not different in the case of an adult man. That is why the famous psychotherapist Freud had crept into the Eros principles of the person. Wherever you go you would find commotion for achieving happiness. Now the happiness is distributed in the nook and corner of the world. The identity of happiness changed into pleasure. Pleasure seeking is the action and passion of the people. Why they seek pleasure? The simple answer is they want happiness. But they are not aware of what they actually want. They try to amass happiness and they remain disappointed. May be that was the reason, why Buddha said, desire was the cause of suffering. In this case, man needs to do two things or he has to work in two realms.
Firstly, he has to eliminate suffering and secondly he has to achieve happiness. Man is, like a pendulum, swinging between these two contradictions. In the Aristotelian virtue ethics, he keeps the tern “happiness”(eudaimonia) as the highest good. Aristotle speaks of the practical aspect of the virtue of happiness. He stresses the point of regular practice makes a person virtuous and enables him to attain the highest goal- happiness.
Virtue refers to human excellence. In their quest to understand what a good person is and how a good life is lived, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle studied human excellences, which came to be called virtues. Virtues are habits of human excellence. Moral virtues are excellences of character acquired through the formation of good habits and are necessary for happiness.
Understanding virtue and the specific virtues that enable people to think and behave well has a real payoff: a serious chance at happiness, defined by Aristotle as a whole life, well lived. The virtue theory of ethics dominated Western moral thinking from ancient times through the middle ages. It made a major comeback in the 20th century. An understanding of what virtue and virtue ethics is all about can help people to see why they need to form good habits of choosing and acting. They concluded that virtue in general and some virtues in particular, enable a person not only to be good, but also to have a good life. People may not always feel the need to be good, but it’s a sure thing that everyone wants to have a good life. It turns out that you can’t have a good life without being good, that is, being virtuous.

“Pleasure” in Aristotle’s View
Aristotle begins Nicomachean Ethics with an explanation of the “chief good.” This good is presented by him through thoughts and theories of the Doctrine of the Mean. He states that all men who are in search of the good and knowledge of “the good” have a profound influence on life. He then writes how a good man, sets goals for himself on a specific task. This experience in the function of the task gives self satisfaction. An example used by Aristotle is a sculptor who participates in the art of sculpting.
To Aristotle, happiness was the activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue and the highest level of happiness could be achieved from the activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with the virtue of thought. Not all conditions of the soul can be called virtues. His Greatest Happiness Principle says that the action we ought to perform in a given situation is the one that promotes the greatest happiness for everyone concerned, not only has the agent’s owned happiness. Virtues are conditions of the soul. Given the contrasting views of happiness by Aristotle and John Stuart Mill one could wonder what Mill would say if Aristotle ever met him and told him that his notion of happiness is worthy only of a swine. He says that people do not get blamed or praised for their feelings but rather for their virtues and vises. Scholars, in his opinion, ultimately led the happiest and most productive life styles. According to Aristotle, feelings are not virtues. The majority of people would become bored really fast and become unhappy with their careers. Mill also has an opinion on the subject of greatest happiness. Mainly, he could say that the definition or the meaning of happiness is different for every person. There are several ways Mill could respond to Aristotle. To Mill, the right action in any given circumstance is the one that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain. Even if you could get everyone to become a scholar, there will be nobody left to do the other essential tasks needed for the general population to survive.

Pleasure V/S Happiness
For Aristotle pleasure and happiness is not the same. Though for us, common people, the concern for the pleasure cannot be eliminated from the very existence. Aristotle frequently emphasizes the importance of pleasure to human life and therefore to his study of how we should live, but his full-scale examination of the nature and value of pleasure is found in two places . It is odd that pleasure receives two lengthy treatments; no other topic in the Ethics is revisited in this way. Book VII offers a brief account of what pleasure is and is not. It is not a process but an unimpeded activity of a natural state. Aristotle does not elaborate on what a natural state is, but he obviously has in mind the healthy condition of the body, especially its sense faculties, and the virtuous condition of the soul. Little is said about what it is for an activity to be unimpeded, but Aristotle does remind us that virtuous activity is impeded by the absence of a sufficient supply of external goods. One might object that people who are sick or who have moral deficiencies can experience pleasure, even though Aristotle does not take them to be in a natural state.
He has two strategies for responding. First, when a sick person experiences some degree of pleasure as he is being restored to health, the pleasure he is feeling is caused by the fact that he is no longer completely ill. Some small part of him is in a natural state and is acting without impediment. Second, Aristotle is willing to say that what seems pleasant to some people may in fact not be pleasant, just as what tastes bitter to an unhealthy palate may not be bitter. To call something a pleasure is not only to report a state of mind but also to endorse it to others. Aristotle's analysis of the nature of pleasure is not meant to apply to every case in which something seems pleasant to someone, but only to activities that really are pleasures. All of these are unimpeded activities of a natural state. Aristotle indicates several times in NE. VII. 11-14 that merely to say that pleasure is a good does not do it enough justice; he also wants to say that the highest good is a pleasure. Here he is influenced by an idea expressed in the opening line of the Ethics: the good is that at which all things aim. In VII.13, he hints at the idea that all living things imitate the contemplative activity of god. Plants and non-human animals seek to reproduce themselves because that is their way of participating in an unending series, and this is the closest they can come to the ceaseless thinking of the unmoved mover. In VII.11-14, he appeals to his conception of divine activity only in order to defend the thesis that our highest good consists in a certain kind of pleasure. Human happiness does not consist in every kind of pleasure, but it does consist in one kind of pleasure—the pleasure felt by a human being who engages in theoretical activity and thereby imitates the pleasurable thinking of god. He conceives of god as a being who continually enjoy a “single and simple pleasure” —the pleasure of pure thought—whereas human beings, because of their complexity, grow weary of whatever they do. Aristotle strongly implies that the pleasure of contemplation is the good, because in one way or another all living beings aim at this sort of pleasure. He makes the point that pleasures interfere with each other, and so even if all kinds of pleasures are good, it does not follow that all of them are worth choosing. One must make a selection among pleasures by determining which are better.
The opening words from the book VII. 11, reads like this: the study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the political philosopher; for he is the architect if the end, with a view to which we ball one thing bad and another good without qualification. Aristotle reminds us that it is the necessary task of each of us to consider them. Most of the people say that happiness involves pleasure; this is why the blessed man is called by s name derived from a word meaning enjoyment.

Conclusion
The virtue ethics of Aristotle provides people with both amazing insight and a powerful plan to shape one’s choices and actions in ways that will increase the chance of attaining happiness. By developing the four cardinal virtues, a person can go very far down the path of a whole life, well lived and the rest is up to good fortune. But even if bad luck ruins the chance, a person of good character, by possessing the moral virtues, will be far better off than those who don’t.
In fact Aristotle gives some tips to how to attain happiness. It is through the regular practice of virtue. As the virtue stands in the middle , he introduces the need of prudence which makes a man discern or distinguish between foolhardiness and cowardice. Prudence (practical wisdom) is a special virtue in that it is an intellectual one, but guides human choices, while the moral virtues are all about doing, or action. To become a better person, we must practice virtuous acts regularly. After a while, these acts will become a habit and so the virtuous acts part of our every day life and the person will be leading a virtuous life. For example, if a singer practices singing everyday, they will become better at it and used to doing it. People who practice their virtues improve their skills and therefore becoming happier. According to Aristotle the person who struggles to acquire virtues is in the long run a better person and is much happier as they feel that they deserve that happiness as they have worked very hard for it. By continuously practicing their virtues people will soon be acting in the right way. Aristotle says that virtues are something that we acquire and are not just born with; people are not intrinsically good or bad, but become good or bad according to their habits they develop throughout our life.
















Bibliography
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Trans. Sir David Ross. Oxford University
Press: London,1959.
Hardie, W.F.R. Aristotle's Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
Crisp, Roger Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

NON-RELATIVE VIRTUES: AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH

NON-RELATIVE VIRTUES: AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH

Introduction

Virtue ethics is a branch of ethics which is gaining more and more interest in today’s world. Today the problem is the new generation wants something that is related to their life, they are not satisfied by those theories that are remote from concrete human experiences. Whether this remoteness results from the utilitarian’s interest in arriving at a universal calculus of satisfaction or from a Kantian concern with universal principles of broad generalities, in which the names of particular contexts, histories and persons do not occur, remoteness is now being seen by an increasing number of moral philosophers as a defect in an approach to ethical questions. It is in this context the concept of virtue is playing a prominent role. So, is the work of Aristotle, the greatest defender of an ethical approach based on the concept of virtue. Aristotelian virtue ethics seems appealing to combine rigour with concreteness, theoretical power with sensitivity to the actual circumstances of human life and choice in all their multiplicity, variety, and mutability. But there is a striking divergence between Aristotle and contemporary virtue theory. To many current proponents of virtue ethics, the return to virtue is connected with a turn towards relativism – that is, the view that the only criterion considered is the local ones, there by virtue ethics of each civilization want to be different. This understanding of virtue ethics makes it a relative one for different traditions and practices. But for Aristotle it is not true. Because he was not only a defender of an ethical theory based on virtues, but also the defender of a single objective account of the human good, or human flourishing. And also Aristotle’s one of the most obvious concerns was the criticism of existing moral traditions that were against human flourishing. Aristotle evidently believed that there is no incompatibility between basing an ethical theory on the virtues and defending the singleness and objectivity of the human good. In this case, it would be odd indeed if he had connected two elements in ethical thought that are incompatible. The purpose of this paper is to establish that Aristotle was a genius who had an interesting way of connecting virtues with a search of ethical objectivity and with the criticism of existing local norms. This way is so important to understand the Aristotelian ethics, to view it as non-relative.

Here my intention is to bring out the non-relativistic face of Aristotelian Virtue ethics. I am doing this based on the article Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach by Martha Nussbaum in the book The Quality of Life

Having described general shape of Aristotelian approach now we can begin to understand some of the objections that might be brought against such a non-relative account of the virtues, and to imagine how Aristotle could respond to those objectives.

1. Virtues a Reflection of Local Traditions and Values

A relativist may think that any list of virtues must be simply a reflection of local traditions and values; there can be no list of virtues that can be normative for all varied societies . By this view ‘The Great Souled’ person of Aristotle will be a Greek gentleman.

But if probe further in to the way in which Aristotle in fact enumerates and individuates the virtues, we can see that things are against these suggestions.

We can see that a rather large number of virtues and vices that Aristotle explain are nameless, and that, among the one that are not nameless; a good many are given, names that are somewhat arbitrarily chosen by Aristotle and do not Perfectly fit the behavior he is trying to describe. This does not sound like the procedure of someone who is simply studying the local traditions and bringing out the virtue-names that figure most prominently in those traditions.

The idea is clearer when we examine the way in which he introduces his list of virtues. In Nicomachean Ethics what he does in each case is to isolate a sphere of human experience that figures in more or less any human life, and in which more or less any human being will have to make some choices rather than others. In each sphere what is required is to act appropriately for that there will be specific actions, and at the end he gives thick definition of the virtue.

On this approach it does not seem possible to say, relativist does, that a given society does not contain anything that corresponds to a given virtue. Nor does it seem to be an open question. The point is everyone makes some choices and acts somehow or other in these sphere, if not properly then improperly.

Here the job of ethical theory will be to search for the best further specification corresponding to this nominal definition, and to produce a full definition.

Now there are three main objections against the non relativism of Aristotelian ethics.

2. The Relationship Between Singleness of Problem and Singleness of Solution

The first objection concerns the relationship between singleness of problem and singleness of solution . We can suppose that the approach succeeds in doing this in a way that embraces many times and places, bringing disparate cultures in a single debate about the good human being and the good human life. Still, it might be argued, what has been achieved is, at best, a single discourse or debate about virtue.

But looking from another perspective the conflicting theories are clearly put forward as competing candidates for the truth; the behavior of those involved in the discourse about virtue suggests that they are indeed, as Aristotle says, searching ‘not for the way of their ancestors, but for the good’. And it seems reasonable in that case for them to do so. It is far less clear, where the virtues are concerned, that a unified practical solution is either sought by the actual participants or a desideratum of them.

The Aristotelian proposal makes it possible to conceive of a way in which the virtues might be non-relative. It does not, by itself, answer the question of relativism.

3. Ground Experiences as in Some Way Primitive

The second objection seems to treat the experiences that ground the virtues as in some way primitive , given, and free from the cultural variation that we find in the plurality of normative conception of virtue. Normative conceptions introduce an element of cultural interpretation that is not present in the grounding experiences, which are, for that very reason, the Aristotelians starting point. But, the objector continues, such assumptions are naïve. They will not stand up either to our best account of experience or to a close examination of the ways in which these so-called grounding experiences are in fact differentially constructed by different cultures.

But we want to consider some other aspects also before reaching to a conclusion; the human mind is an active and interpretative instrument, and that its interpretations are a function of its history and its concepts, as well as of its innate nature. Also the nature of human world interpretations is holistic and that the criticism of them must, equally, be holistic. But these two factors do not imply, as some relativists in literary theory and in anthropology tend to assume, that all world interpretations are equally valid and altogether non-comparable. Certain ways in which people see the world can still be criticized exactly as Aristotle criticized them: as stupid, pernicious, and false . The standards used in such criticisms must come from inside human life. Also despite the evident differences in the specific cultural shaping of the grounding experiences, we do recognize the experience of people in other cultures as similar to our own. We do converse with them about matters of deep importance; understand them, allow ourselves to move by them. This sense of community and overlap seems to be especially strong in the areas that we have called the areas of the grounding experiences. And this, it seems, supports the Aristotelian claim that those experiences can be a good starting point for ethical debate. Thus Aristotle seeks, instead, to discover, among the experiences of groups in many times and places, certain elements that are especially broadly and deeply shared. Here also it is evident that Aristotelian virtues are non-elative.

4. Universal and Necessary Features as Contingent

The third objection against non-relativism of Aristotelian ethics is that, Aristotelian has taken for universal and necessary features of human life an experience that is contingent on certain non-necessary historical conditions. Like the second this argument also says that human experience is much more profoundly shaped by non-necessary social features than the Aristotelian has allowed. Therefore the virtues are defined relatively to certain problems and limitations, and also to certain endowments.

In counter to this argument Aristotle will say that our morality is an essential feature of our circumstances as human beings. An immoral being would have such a different form of life, and such different values and virtues that it does not seem to make sense to regard that being as part of the same search for good. In general it seems that all forms of life, including the imagined life of god contains boundaries and limits . Thus it does not appear that we will not easily get beyond the virtues. Nor does it seem to be so clearly a good thing for human life that we should.

Conclusion

So much for our outline sketch for the good. For it looks as if we have to draw an outline first, and fill it in later. It would seem to be open to anyone to take things further and to articulate the god parts of the sketch. And time is a good discoverer or ally in such things. That’s how the sciences have progressed as well: it is open to anyone to supply what is lacking .(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a20-6.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nussbaum, Martha C. “Non-relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” in The

Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

VIRTUOUS ACTION MAKE A GOOD CHARACTER

VIRTUOUS ACTION MAKE A GOOD CHARACTER

Introduction
Aristotle divided the virtue or excellence into two kinds, intellectual excellence and moral excellence, which is the excellence of this semi-rational faculty of desire. The book II is beginning with the consideration of virtue. Virtue has, too, an essential connexion with pleasure and pain, it is not by indifference to these, but by taking pleasure in the right things and to the right degree, that men become virtuous. Aristotle points out that acts which are such as a just man would do are not just acts unless they are done as the just man would do them. That it is possible to do acts which are on the outside precisely those that a just man would do, but to do them without the knowledge that they are just, or without the desire to do them because they are just, or without having the firm character that a just man has. He deals the question what kind of thing virtue is a passion, a faculty, or a state of character.

Moral virtue like the arts

Virtues are of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching, while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. None of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.
All the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity; but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them ; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.
By doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger. States of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.
The present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge but practical knowledge. We are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good. By abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them.

Pleasure by doing virtues actions

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones.
If the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries.
The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure.
It has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions.
It is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, but both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.
The virtue, is concerned with pleasures and pains , and that by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which it actualizes itself.

The arts and the virtues
What we mean by saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate.
The case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar, for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.
Actions, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them. By doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.

Conclusion
Just as men become builders by building, they become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts: ‘states of character arise out of like activities’. It is very easy to explain that virtue is a state of character. It remains to say what sort of state of character it is. It is an intermediate state. The act must be done at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way. ‘Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relatively to us, this being determined by a rational principle, i.e. by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it’ .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle,trans. David Ross. London: Oxford
University Press, 1925.

VIRTUOUS ACTION MAKE A GOOD CHARACTER

VIRTUOUS ACTION MAKE A GOOD CHARACTER

Introduction
Aristotle divided the virtue or excellence into two kinds, intellectual excellence and moral excellence, which is the excellence of this semi-rational faculty of desire. The book II is beginning with the consideration of virtue. Virtue has, too, an essential connexion with pleasure and pain, it is not by indifference to these, but by taking pleasure in the right things and to the right degree, that men become virtuous. Aristotle points out that acts which are such as a just man would do are not just acts unless they are done as the just man would do them. That it is possible to do acts which are on the outside precisely those that a just man would do, but to do them without the knowledge that they are just, or without the desire to do them because they are just, or without having the firm character that a just man has. He deals the question what kind of thing virtue is a passion, a faculty, or a state of character.

Moral virtue like the arts

Virtues are of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching, while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. None of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.
All the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity; but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them ; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.
By doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger. States of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.
The present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge but practical knowledge. We are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good. By abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them.

Pleasure by doing virtues actions

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones.
If the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries.
The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure.
It has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions.
It is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, but both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.
The virtue, is concerned with pleasures and pains , and that by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which it actualizes itself.

The arts and the virtues
What we mean by saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate.
The case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar, for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.
Actions, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them. By doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.

Conclusion
Just as men become builders by building, they become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts: ‘states of character arise out of like activities’. It is very easy to explain that virtue is a state of character. It remains to say what sort of state of character it is. It is an intermediate state. The act must be done at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way. ‘Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relatively to us, this being determined by a rational principle, i.e. by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it’ .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle,trans. David Ross. London: Oxford
University Press, 1925.

JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE; ACCORDING TO NICHOMACHEN ETHICS

JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE; ACCORDING TO NICHOMACHEN ETHICS

INTRODUCTION
Justice can mean either lawfulness or fairness, since injustice is lawlessness and unfairness. The laws encourage people to behave virtuously, so the just person, who by definition is lawful, will necessarily be virtuous. Virtue differs from justice because it deals with one’s moral state, while justice deals with one’s relations with others. Universal justice is that state of a person who is generally lawful and fair. Particular justice deals with the “divisible” goods of honor, money, and safety, where one person’s gain of such goods results in a corresponding loss by someone else.
There are two forms of particular justice: distributive and rectificatory. Distributive justice deals with the distribution of wealth among the members of a community. It employs geometric proportion: what each person receives is directly proportional to his or her merit, so a good person will receive more than a bad person. This justice is a virtuous mean between the vices of giving more than a person deserves and giving less.
Rectificatory justice remedies unequal distributions of gain and loss between two people. Rectification may be called for in cases of injustice involving voluntary transactions like trade or involuntary transactions like theft or assault. Justice is restored in a court case, where the judge ensures that the gains and losses of both parties are equaled out, thus restoring a mean.
Justice must be distributed proportionately. For instance, a shoemaker and a farmer cannot exchange one shoe for one harvest, since shoes and harvests are not of equal value. Rather, the shoemaker would have to give a number of shoes proportional in value to the crops the farmer provides. Money reflects the demand placed on various goods and allows for just exchanges.
Political justice and domestic justice are related but distinct. Political justice is governed by the rule of law, while domestic justice relies more on respect. Political justice is based in part on natural law, which is the same for all people, and in part on particular legal conventions, which vary from place to place.
An agent is responsible only for acts of injustice performed voluntarily. We call injustice done out of ignorance “mistakes,” injustice done because plans went awry “misadventures,” and injustice done knowingly but without premeditation “injuries.” Ignorance is an excuse only if it is reasonably unavoidable.
Aristotle reasons that no one can willingly suffer an injustice and that when goods are unjustly distributed, the distributor is more culpable than the person who receives the largest share. People mistakenly think that justice is an easy matter, as it simply requires obedience to laws. However, true justice comes only from a virtuous disposition, and those lacking in virtue are unable to perceive the just course of action in all cases.
Laws may not always be perfectly applicable. In particular circumstances in which the laws do not produce perfect justice, equity is necessary to mend the imbalance. Therefore, equity is superior to legal justice but inferior to absolute justice.
It is impossible to treat oneself unjustly. Injustice involves one person gaining at another’s expense, so it requires at least two people. Even in the case of suicide, it is not the victim, but the state, that suffers an injustice.
MEANING OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
By justice we mean that a state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and helps them to act justly and wish for what is just. Similarly injustice is alslo a state which makes people to act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. These are the two contrary state. And we can recognized one contrary state from the subject that exhibit them, for example if good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known, and good condition is known form the things that are in good condition. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is necessary that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh. And in most cases if one contrary is ambiguous the other also will be ambiguous.
According to aristotle the just man is lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair. Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man just and the lawful acts laid down by the legislative. These lawful acts aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort. So that we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness.
Justice is considered as a complete virtue because of its relation to another. Every virtue is comprehended in justice. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards another also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to others. Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercise it towards another. Justice in these sense, is not part of virtue but uthe whole of virtue,and injustice is part of vie but the whole of vice. What the difference is between virtue and justice in this sense is that they are the same but their essence is not the same.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Since both the unjust man and the unjust act are unfair or unequal, there is an intermediate between the two unequals involved in either case. If the unjust is unequal, the just is equal,and the same equality will exist between the persons and between the things concerned. When either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares, the awards should be ‘according to merit’. And all men are agreed that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not the same sort of merit,but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth and supporters of aristocracy with virtue.
Then just is a species of the proportionate, and proportion is a equality of ratio. For example, as the line A is to the line B, so is the line B to the line C; the line B, then , has been mentioned twice, so that if the line B be assumed twice, the proportional term will be four,and the ratio between one pair is the same as that between the other pair; for there is a similar distiniction between the persons and between the things. So the conjunction of the term A with C and of B with D is what is just in distribution. Then what the just is- the proportional and unjust is what violates the proportion.
RECTIFICATORY JUSTICE
It arises in connection with transaction both voluntary and involuntary. But the justice in transactions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that kind of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. As it involves a kind of inequality the judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant.
Here the term loss and gain comes from voluntary exchange; and if you have more than one’s own is called gaining, and to have less than one’s original share is called losing. For example, in buying and selling and in all other matters in which the law has left people free to make their own terms; but when they get neither more nor less but just what belongs to themselves, they say that they have their own and that they neither lose nor gain.
Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss, namely, those which are involuntary; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction.
POLITICAL JUSTICE
Political justice found among men who share their life with a view to self-suffciency.Men who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equall, so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy. For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law exists for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust.
And between men between whom unjustice is done there is also unjust actionm,and this is assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves. This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle,because a man behaves thus in his own interests and becomes a tyrant.
Political justice is partly natural and partly legal. Naturaly,that which everywhere has the same force and does not exists by people thinking this or that, legaly,that which is originaly indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent. By nature it is unchangable and has everywhere the same force, while they see change in the things recongnized as just.
The things which are just by virtue of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature buy by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since consititutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the best.

CONCLUSION
This is the short summary of the topic ‘justice’ in the Nicomachen Ethics of Aristotle. In this he explain what is justice and injustice. According to him justice is a state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and helps them to act justly and wish for what is just. Similarly injustice is alslo a state which makes people to act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. And the just man is lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair.
There are different kind of justice and injustice, namely distributive, rectificatory and political. In distributive we should keep justice in the distribution of wealth. It should be distributed equaly to all. Rectificatory justice arises from the voluntary and involutary transaction between man. Political justice is partly natural and partly legal. And naturaly it is same force in everywhere, and in legaly it is one and the same but different from place to place and coutry to country.
BIBILIOGRAPHY
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics By Aristotle. Trans. David Ross. Newyork; Cosmo
Publication, 2003.
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. David Ross. Newyork; Oxford University
Press, 2009.


JINTO ERINJERY
0924604

VIRTUE ETHICS

ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF VIRTUE ETHICS



Virtue ethics is an approach to ethics that emphasizes the character of the moral agent, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking. This contrasts with consequentialism, which holds that the consequences of a particular act form the basis for any valid moral judgment about that action, and deontology, which derives rightness or wrongness form the character of the act itself rather than the outcomes. The difference between these three approaches to morality tends to lie more in the way moral dilemmas are approached than n the moral conclusions reached. Virtue theory is not actually in conflict with deontology or teleology: those two viewpoints deal with which actions a person should take in any given scenario, whereas virtue theorists simply argue that developing morally desirable virtues for their own sake will help aid moral actions when such decisions need to be made.

The central questions of virtue ethics

Unlike utilitarianism and Kant, whose central question is ‘What ought I to do in these circumstances?’ the central questions of virtue ethics are:
‘What is the good life for me as a human being?’
‘What kind of person should I want to become?’
‘How do I achieve both of these goals?’
The answer to all three questions involves the virtues. The good life is a virtuous life. You should try to become a virtuous person, and the how of achieving these goals is via the virtues. The virtues are the means and the end. Only when you’ve got the virtues can you be relied on to do the right thing as the natural outcome of a good character. None of this will be of much help unless we know what the virtues are and how to get them. This is where Aristotle comes in.

Aristotle’s theory

Aristotle begins his explanation and justification of the virtues and the good life by pointing out that all things in the universe have a purpose. They aim at some end, which is built in to their nature. For example, the purpose of the sun is to give light and heat to the earth; the rain’s job is to water the ground so plants can grow. The plants’ job is to feed the animals, and the lower animals are food for the higher animals, and so on. This focuses on how different specie of things is interrelated in what we now cal ecosystems, or what ‘the Lion King’s calls the circle of life. But, in addition, each species has a telos internal to and peculiar to itself. For example, the purpose or goal of an acorn is to grow into an oak tree, of a kitten into a cat, lambs into sheep, bulbs into tulips, and so on.
But if all things in the universe have a telos, then so must human beings. Aristotle uses a further argument to prove this, namely, the function argument, which has three strands. Firstly, people make things to have functions or jobs, e.g. a knife’s function is to cut’ a wheel’s function is to roll. So the cause of these functioning things must also have a function, and that means us.
Secondly, people are part of society and they have functions within it – e.g. plumbers, farmer, bakers- so society itself must have a function, since it’s made up of functioning parts – us.
Thirdly, people’s bodies are made up of parts that have functions. For example, the function of the eye is to see, and the ear to hear. This must mean that the whole human being must have an overall function, since it’s composed of bits that have functions.
Aristotle concludes that there’s a meaning, or purpose, to human life, which it is in our nature to aim for. Human nature has a function; it is for something. The big question is, ‘What?”
An initial and partial answer is that all things, and therefore we too, aim for the Good. Our purpose is our essence; it’s the realization of our natural potential. The same goes for everything else, only their ends will differ according to their natures. Nothing well made seeks its own destruction, but rather targets its good. What makes a good tiger is not what makes a good apple, but each is good relative to its nature. So, realizing our potential is good for us, given our nature. But although a thing’s end or telos is good for it, it won’t do it any good if its’ no good at achieving this. It must ‘choose’ good or efficient means to achieve its end. The means are as important as the end, for without them you get nowhere. So we need to find out two things: what is our end, and how do we achieve it?
You need good, efficient, excellent means to achieve an excellent end. The Greek word for ‘excellence’ is arête, which is normally translated ‘virtue’. In ancient Greece ‘virtue’ means any kind of excellence. Sharpness is a virtue in knives because it’s part of their purpose to be sharp. Sharpness is one of the characteristics that make a knife good. The virtue needed in a good apple are to be juicy, shiny, round, fresh, and so on. These qualities, these virtues, don’t spring into existence overnight, just as the apple reaches its maturity, but are instead gradually refined; they’re there all along and indeed are part of the means as well as being the end products. So virtues are excellent features, or characteristics, that a make a thing good.
To find out what the human virtues are, we need to know two things. Firstly, what is the good life for human beings? Secondly what are the most excellent character traits for achieving the goal of the good life? There are two clues to finding out the answer to the first question. Firstly, find out what is distinctive of human nature as opposed to any other kind of thing or animal – something belonging only to us. Secondly, ask people what they ultimately want from life.
For Aristotle, what is distinctive of human nature is reason. Aristotle’s answer to the second clue is that what people ultimately want from life is to be happy.
The virtues are the only things worth pursuing for their own sake, for they constitute the deepest happiness and true honour. True happiness is not the same thing as having pleasurable states of mind, but is instead the process of flourishing, of one’s nature flowering. It is the joy of being what you’re meant to be, of doing what you’re meant to do, and doing it well- of being a good specimen of your species. It is fulfilling your ‘destiny’. The virtuous life is our telos. Aristotle’s word for the true happiness of a fulfilled and flourishing life is eudaimonia.
Aristotle’s view of the virtue is that it is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the man relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Too much or too little of anything is bad for you. This is a truth of reason. So the right amount is somewhere in between the two extremes. This is Aristotle’s famous doctrine of the mean, also known as ‘the golden mean’ or ‘the happy medium’. This is where the virtues lie – on the mean between the extremes of emotion and character. On each extreme lies a vice: if too much, it’s a vice of excess; if too little, it’s a vice deficiency. For example, courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness.

Conclusion
Virtue ethics initially emerged as a rival account to deontology and consequentialism. It developed from dissatisfaction with the notions of duty and obligation and their central roles in understanding morality. It also grew out of an objection to the use of rigid moral rules and principles and their application to diverse and different moral situations. Characteristically, virtue ethics makes a claim about the central role of virtue and character in its understanding of moral life and uses it to answer the questions “how should I live?” what kind of person should I be?”


References:
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. tran. Ross David. Oxford: Oxford University press, 1925.
Benn, Piers, Ethics. London: UCL Press, 1998, ch. 7.
Stewart, Noel. Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. USA: Polity Press, 2009.

CONCEPT OF VIRTUE IN MENO

Concept of Virtue in Meno

1. Introduction

Meno is one of the most important works of Plato. This book is written is the form of a dialogue. The dialogue is between Socrates and Meno. Meno is asking questions and Socrates is answering them. In the course of discussion, two other people appear, namely, a boy (Meno’s slave) and Anytus, a member of a prominent Athenian family. The book attempts to determine the definition of virtue or arête, meaning in this case virtue in general rather than particular virtues (e.g. justice, temperance, etc.). The goal is to infer a definition that applies equally to all particular virtues and to find out whether virtues can be taught. In this book we can also find how Socrates is making distinction between skill and virtue. He does so to refute the belief that virtuous people are those who can perform some action with excellence like ruling a state or doing a excellent horse ridding, etc. this book also give an account of Socrates’ famous ‘theory of recollection’ according which learning is possible only through recollection. There is more than one theme discussed within Meno.

2. What is Virtue?

Meno asks to Socrates what virtue is and where does it come form. Socrates admits that he does not know what it is and therefore he cannot say where it comes from. He explains, for example, that it is difficult to say about a person whether he is fair or not fair, rich or poor, noble or opposite of noble, without knowing him. Therefore, in the same way, he cannot say anything about virtue unless he knows about it. Meno then defines virtue as the power of governing mankind. But Socrates disagrees with Meno. Socrates believes that virtue (arête) is not a form of knowledge and furthermore that true virtue can not be defined. In the course of discussion, Socrates cites true opinion as a major attribute of virtue and also that virtue is the gift from God to the virtuous people. Unlike the skills (horse ridding, swimming, wrestling, etc.) virtues cannot be acquired. It is also not natural. Virtues are the same for all.

3. Nature of Virtue

According to Meno's virtue is different for men and women, children, elders and so forth. For men it is found in managing public affairs so that they benefit his friends and harm his enemies; for women it is found in managing the home. Socrates directs Meno so that he understands that the virtue must be same (the sameness that all virtuous people share, its essence) for all and explains this concept by asking Meno about health. Health is the same in all. In doing this Socrates is trying to show Meno that the nature of virtue will be the same in all things. The only change is the way in which we perceive it from individual to individual. Meno then offers a reformed definition that virtue is the ability to rule over people since that is what all of his examples had in common. Socrates quickly reforms this definition saying, "Shall we not add to this justly and not justly?" Meno affirms this suggestion and says that justice is virtue. He also thinks that courage, moderation, wisdom, and munificence among other things are virtues. This is obviously the same problem that they had before by implicating too many virtues instead of the single nature of virtue that all of these things have. Socrates continues in his patience with Meno and they discuss about who and how the right definition will be supplied until Meno attempts again to define virtue as desiring the beautiful and having the power to acquire them.

4. Is Virtue the Same for All?

Socrates with the example of bees tries to explain that the virtues are the same for all irrespective of their gender, age, conditions of life, social status, etc. As bees don’t differ form each other as bees, though of many different kinds, in the same way, virtues as virtues are the same for all. No house or state or anything can be well ordered without temperance and without justice. Therefore, those who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice. Then both men and women, if they want to be good, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice. Finally, we can say that all people are good in the same way and by the participation in the same virtues.

5. Theory of recollection

In this view learning is impossible. Socrates must now show how learning is possible and he does this by introducing the theory of recollection. He begins by citing a passage from a poem that claims that the soul is immortal and that there is nothing it has not learned in the underworld. If this is true, as Socrates believes, it is never impossible for man to learn because he merely needs to recall that which his soul already knows, but is not aware of knowing. Meno would like further explanation so Socrates asks him to call in a servant to demonstrate the process of recollection. His goal is to show that the slave, who knows nothing of geometry, actually can recall some knowledge of the subject and therefore is able to answer the questions that Socrates asks of him. And indeed, Meno witnesses the slave answer correctly about the geometric figures, and length of lines, and so forth. Meno is convinced of this theory and agrees that the slave, who does not appear to know, has within himself true opinions about the things which he does not know.

6. Can Virtue Be Taught?

Now Socrates says that if virtue is a kind of knowledge, then it can be learned. If it is something other than a kind of knowledge, it obviously cannot be taught. They both believe that virtue is at least something good, and beneficial to those who encounter it. Socrates later makes an argument that all things in the soul found to be beneficial must be a kind of wisdom. But he does not yet say that it is teachable for if it was then it would make sense only if there were teachers for it, and as far as Socrates can tell, there are no teachers of virtue. He calls Anytusa, member of a prominent Athenian family, into the conversation to explore the question of whether virtue can be found among the politicians. Anytus expresses contempt for teachers like the Sophists and he debates with Socrates about the failure of fathers to teach their sons to be virtuous, and the failure of public officials to exhibit virtue for their citizens. Socrates concludes that virtue cannot be taught as evidenced by his previous examples and Anytus accuses Socrates of being too harsh on people, speaking ill of them too easily at which time he excuses himself from the conversation.

7. Conclusion

The discussion ends with the view that the virtue is neither natural nor acquired. It is an instinct given by God to the virtuous people. This instinct is not accompanied by the reason. The virtue comes to the virtuous as a gift from God. But how virtue is given, cannot be known unless there is an enquiry into the actual nature of virtue. It cannot be taught by anybody. Socrates rejects the idea that human virtue depends on a person’s gender or age. He proposes the idea that the virtues are common to all people that temperance and justice are virtues even in children and old men. He also affirms that the virtue is not the ‘capacity to govern men’ (as was proposed by Meno). Socrates points out to the slaveholder that ‘governing well’ cannot be a virtue of a slave, because then he would not be a slave.

Reference: Plato. Meno, trans. Benjamin Jowett.http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/meno.html

VIRTUE ETHICS - MACINTYRE

MacIntyre – The Concept of a Practice and the Origin of the Virtues

There is an element of what is missing in modern life through MacIntyre’s use of the concept of a practice. He illustrates this with the example of a person wishing to teach a disinterested child how to play chess.

The teaching process may begin with the teacher offering the child candy to play and enough additional candy if the child wins to motivate the child to play. It might be assumed that this is sufficient to motivate the child to learn to play chess well, but as MacIntyre notes, it is sufficient only to motivate the child to learn to win- which may mean cheating if the opportunity arises. However, overtime, the child may come to appreciate the unique combination of skills and abilities that chess calls on, and may learn to enjoy exercising and developing those skills and abilities. At this point, the child will be interested in learning to play chess well for its own sake.

There are two kinds of goods attached to the practice of chess-playing and to practices in general. One kind, external goods which are goods attached to the practice “by the accidents of social circumstances.” In the example, the candy given to the child is typically money, power, and fame in the real world. Internal goods are the goods that can only be achieved by participating in the practice itself. The two kinds of goods differ in their nature and internal goods are competed, “but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the practice.”

A well played chess game benefits both the winner and loser, and the community as well. Politics should be a practice with internal goods, but as it is now it only leads to external goods. When individuals first start to engage in a practice, they have no choice but to agree to accept external standards for the evaluation of their performance and to agree to follow the rules set out for the practice: “ A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods.” So he might point out that an important part of becoming a grand master at chess is studying records of games, examining their philosophies, practice regimens, and the psychological tactics they employed on their opponents. The rules and standards have developed in the past and are binding on the present, and although they can sometimes be changed by the community as a whole those changes should be consistent with the principles of the game as it has developed in the past.
Practices are important because it is only within the context of practices, such as money and power, can be achieved in a variety of ways, some good and some bad. But achieving the goods that are internal to a practice, we acquire the presence of the virtues in terms of practices: A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and the exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices. The necessity of virtues like honesty, courage, and justice follow logically from the definition of a practice, virtues and morality can only make sense in the context of a practice: they require a shared end, shared rules, and shared standards of evaluation. The virtues are those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or not, we define our relationships to those other people with whom we share the kind of purposes and standards which inform practices.

Members of a community must be honest with each other when they instruct others in the principles of the practice, when they explain the rules to them, and when they evaluate their performance. Courage, MacIntyre says, is a virtue “because the care and concern for individuals, communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in practices requires the existence of such a virtue.” Practitioners of a shared practice come to genuinely care about each other, and genuinely caring about others means a willingness to risk harm or danger on their behalf and that is what courage is.

Justice requires that we treat others in respect of merit or desert according to uniform and impersonal standards.” So virtues such as honesty, courage, and justice have meaning in the context of a practice.

Why does MacIntyre care so much about practices? It is because he believes that there are a number of things that have been practices in the past, currently are not, and chief among these is politics. It is possible to think of politics as a practice within a community that has a shared aim, same standards of excellence, the same rules, and the same traditions. Indeed, in MacIntyre’s view, politics is a sort of meta-practice, because it is the practice of determining the best life for human beings, a life which will include engaging in other practices. Here MacIntyre parallels Aristotle’s language about politics as the science ordering the other sciences. The benefits of a practice would then flow to those who participated in politics. In fact, certain important benefits could only be achieved by political participation and politics would make people more virtuous rather than less virtuous as it now does.


Bibliography
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtues. 2nd edition. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross. New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1925.